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Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine:
Section 1983, Res Judicata and the
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By WILLIAMSON B.C. CHANG*
One of the visible concerns of the Supreme Court in recent years
has been the delicate balancing of interests expressed by the concept of
"our federalism."' The competing concerns of state judicial sover-
eignty and federal power that are embodied within this concept typi-
cally come into sharp conflict in federal court actions brought in
response to alleged deprivations of constitutional rights by state courts.
Such actions are generally brought under the authority of section 1983
of Title 42 of the United States Code,2 which provides a right of action
for persons deprived under color of state law "of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the [federal] Constitution and laws."' 3 The
role of the federal district courts has been central in this confrontation,
for often these are the courts that intervene in state court proceedings.
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Although I represent the State of Hawaii in three cases discussed herein, Sotomura v.
County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp.
559 (D. Hawaii 1977) (amicus curiae); and Zimring v. Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii,
filed June 25, 1979), the views expressed in this Article are strictly my own.
1. "This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with crim-
inal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of 'comity,'
that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to per-
form their separate functions in their separate ways. This. . .is referred to by many as 'Our
Federalism' ...." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
3. Id.
4. The Supreme Court has stated: "The very purpose of [42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)] was
to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the peo-
ple's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state
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The Supreme Court has also evinced a strong interest in balancing
concerns of state sovereignty and federal power, as shown by Younger
v. Harris5 and its progeny. 6 In contrast to the Court's active review in
the Younger area, however, the Supreme Court has cautiously avoided
another prominent area of federal and state judicial conflict. In the last
decade the lower federal courts have often faced the question of
whether a federal action under section 1983, brought subsequent to a
state court proceeding, is barred by res judicata. 7 In Preiser v. Rodri-
guez,8 the Court suggested that the question had been resolved in favor
of applying res judicata,9 and in Ellis v. Dyson,'0 the Court declined to
address the question altogether." Considering the confusion among
the circuit courts of appeal, 2 reluctance to confront this question' 3 may
law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative or judicial.' " Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 242 (1972) (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)). The Younger line of
cases involving federal challenges to state court judgments, discussed herein, illustrates the
many instances where federal courts have been called on to intervene in state court action.
5. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975);
Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401
U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), are representative of the major
Younger developments of the 1970s.
7. Eg., Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st
Cir. 1978); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1978); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d
361 (9th Cir. 1977); Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Ill., 557 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1977); Graves
v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1977); Cornwell v. Ferguson, 545 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1977);
Rios v. Cessna Fin. Corp., 488 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1973); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96 (3d Cir.
1973).
8. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
9. "On the other hand, resjudicata has been held to be fully applicable to a civil rights
action brought under § 1983." Id. at 497 (citations omitted).
10. 421 U.S. 426 (1975).
11. Id. at 439-41 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's
silence on this issue, see generally Torke, Res Judicata in Federal Civil Rights Actions Follow-
ing State Litigation, 9 IND. L. REv. 543, 544-46 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Torke].
12. The confusion among courts was noted by the Sixth Circuit in Getty v. Reed, 547
F.2d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 1977): "If what we have said thus far suggests that the District Judge
who held he had 'no jurisdiction' to try this case simply missed the signs on a well marked
trail, we hasten to acknowledge that no such thing is true. One commentator, Theis, has
noted that the Supreme Court has given no guidance as to claim preclusion by final state
court decision in § 1983 cases and added that as a result 'the decisions of the lower courts
teem with inconsistencies.' "
All circuit courts of appeal at one time or another have applied res judicata to bar a
subsequent claim. See, e.g., Davis v. Towe, 526 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1975); Blankner v. City of
Chicago, 504 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1974); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1973); Francisco Ent.,
Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974); Metros v.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
appear more a matter of prudence than of hesitance.
Confusion about the propriety of a section 1983 action subsequent
to a state court judgment has been compounded by uncertainty con-
cerning the interplay of res judicata and the general jurisdictional prin-
ciples expressed in Rooker v. Fideli y Trust Co.,'4 prohibiting lower
federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction. Many courts have
confused the Rooker doctrine with res judicata;' 5 the doctrine also has
been confused with the principles announced in Younger and its prog-
United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1970); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n,
431 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 951 (1970); Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1955). These cases are
cited in Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 322 n.106
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Currie]. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits on occa-
sion have not applied res judicata fully. See Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1977);
Blunt v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 515 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1975); Lombard v. Board of
Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975); Ney v. California, 439
F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971).
There has also been confusion within the approaches taken by a single circuit. In New
Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 773 n.48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894
(1978), the Third Circuit pointed out the inconsistencies in the Fifth Circuit position: "The
Fifth Circuit has taken a somewhat inconsistent position. Compare Blunt v. Marion County
Bd. of Educ., 515 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff allowed to raise federal claims not
pressed in state court litigation previously); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051,
1055-58 (5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff allowed to challenge zoning ordinance as unconstitutional,
despite his prior attempt to overturn it on state grounds in state court), with Jennings v.
Caddo Parish School Bd., 531 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 . . .
(dictum) (prior state court judgment conclusive as to issues which might have been litigated);
Cornwell v. Ferguson, 545 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1977) (same)." The Second Circuit also has
arrived at inconsistent decisions. Comfpare Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978)
(res judicata bars issues which could have been raised) and Tang v. New York Supreme
Court, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974) (res judicata bars claims
implicitly decided), with Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1977) (issues not raised
not barred by res judicata), Newman v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 1004 (1975) (same), and Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 976 (1975) (same).
13. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases presenting this issue on many
occasions. See, e.g., Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 834 (1977); Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066 (1976); Newman v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975).
14. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
15. See, e.g., Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425 (2d Cir. 1978); Getty v. Reed, 547,
F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1977); Hutcherson v. Lahtin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Roy v.
Jones, 484 F.2d 96, 99 n. I1 (3d Cir. 1973); Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Properties, Inc.,
480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1021 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970) (Rives, J., dissenting); Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148, 150
(8th Cir. 1955); Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Reimel, 266 F. Supp. 168, 170 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
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eny. 16 Thus, the res judicata effect of state court decisions on subse-
quent section 1983 actions remains unclear.
With few exceptions,' 7 commentators have been critical of cases
applying res judicata to bar federal actions under section 1983 subse-
quent to a state court judgment and have argued for excepting these
actions from the principles of merger and bar.' 8 This Article suggests
that there is a vehicle more appropriate than res judicata for resolving
the question of whether unsuccessful state court litigants may attack
state court judgments in subsequent federal actions. This vehicle is the
Rooker doctrine. In addition, this Article presents an alternative to the
interpretation of Rooker as an independent jurisdictional doctrine' 9 by
analyzing the principles of the Rooker doctrine as an aspect of res judi-
cata. Rooker suggests the merger and bar2° principles of res judicata
are jurisdictional principles2' and therefore cannot be waived, 22 a view
16. See text accompanying notes 209-42 infra. See also New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v.
Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); Piatt v. Louisville & Jeffer-
son City Bd. of Educ., 556 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1977); Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369,
371 (9th Cir. 1977); Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978
(1974); Kay v. Florida Bar, 323 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
17. E.g., Currie, supra note 12, at 327-32 (arguing that § 1983 does not create an excep-
tion to res judicata).
18. Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. COLO. L.
REV. 191, 195-96 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Averitt] (exception to res judicata where state
remedies exhausted and federal claimant was an unwilling defendant in state proceedings);
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983.: Limits on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional
Claims, 60 VA. L. REV. 250, 276-77 (1974) (pt. II) [hereinafter cited as McCormack] (res
judicata should not bar subsequent § 1983 action (1) where litigation was between individ-
ual and state, (2) the state had an institutional interest in the litigation, and (3) there was a
procedural due process defect); Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction
to the Problem, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 859, 882 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Theis] (res judicata
should apply only where litigant has freely presented constitutional claims for resolution);
Torke, supra note 11, at 574 (distinction between bar and merger principles and collateral
estoppel); Developments in the Law. Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133,
1351 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments] (collateral estoppel should not apply to sub-
sequent § 1983 actions).
19. Rooker has been viewed by the courts as a jurisdictional bar to relitigation. Tang v.
New York Supreme Court, 487 F.2d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906
(1974); Hanley v. Four Comers Vacation Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973);
Community Action Group v. City of Columbus, 473 F.2d 966, 973 (5th Cir. 1973); Paul v.
Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970); Brown v.
Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); Maurice v.
Board of Directors, 450 F. Supp. 755, 759 (E.D. Va. 1977).
20. "Bar" and "merger" are the claim preclusion aspects of res judicata. RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note at 158-59 (1942). Professor Vestal has used the
term "claim preclusion" in place of bar and merger. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion: Expan-
sion, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 357 (1974).
21. See text accompanying notes 107-24 infra. See generally Theis, supra note 18, at
880 (raising question of the relationship between Rooker and res judicata).
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contrary to the traditional characterization of merger and bar as affirm-
ative defenses. 23 Because any claim that the federal district courts
would lack jurisdiction to hear under Rooker also would be barred by a
previous judgment under principles of res judicata, the scope of claim
preclusion is identical under the two doctrines. Accordingly, any action
barred by res judicata also would be barred by Rooker. Thus, in deter-
mining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, if the law of the
state rendering the judgment would require the application of res judi-
cata, the federal court must apply bar or merger and dismiss the action
even if the issue was not raised by the parties.
As an obligatory, 24 statutorily-based 25 expression of federalism,
Rooker is the appropriate basis for deciding the issue of a subsequent
attack on a state court judgment by a federal action. Rooker also can
apply to those cases now resolved only through a strained application
of Younger.26 Furthermore, this Article demonstrates that Rooker is
consistent with the recent Supreme Court cases 27 attempting to pre-
serve the authority and independence of state judicial systems. The
result reached in Rooker has been termed "obvious," 28 and "unim-
peachable in context."'29 Perhaps so, but what has not been obvious are
the sweeping ramifications of the doctrine that derive from the statute
governing the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Rooker, although long
ignored in favor of other doctrines, is an embodiment of fundamental
principles of federalism 30 and no longer should be overlooked.
22. See text accompanying notes 107-18 infra. See Maurice v. Board of Directors, 450
F. Supp. 755, 759 (E.D. Va. 1977) (difference between Rooker and res judicata).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (res judicata an affirmative defense). See also Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 n.19 (1975).
24. Since Rooker is jurisdictional, a court must dismiss a case on its own motion if the
case violates Rooker principles. See Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970); Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan R.R. v. Swan, I ll
U.S. 379, 384 (1884). See text accompanying notes 39-42 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 73-80 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 206-41 infra.
27. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
In addition to Younger and its progeny, the Burger Court has been active in resolving feder-
alism questions in other areas as well. Some of the more salient instances are Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (federal securities regulation not to displace state
corporation law); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas corpus); National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (tenth amendment applied to congressional action con-
cerning essential state functions).
28. Theis, supra note 18, at 879.
29. Brief for Appellee McBryde Sugar Co. at 51, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp.
559 (D. Hawaii 1977).
30. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 274 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The Rooker Doctrine
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.31 the losing party to a state court
action sought a bill in equity in federal court to declare null and void
an Indiana state court judgment.32 Except for the addition of two de-
fendants, all of the parties in the federal action were the same as those
in the state action.33 The plaintiffs asserted that the state court judg-
ment upholding an Indiana state statute violated the contracts clause
and the due process and equal protection provisions of the fourteenth
amendment.34 After deciding that the state court acted within its juris-
dictional power,35 the Supreme Court explicitly held that the federal
district court had no jurisdiction to review the state court judgment. 36
The Supreme Court emphasized the statutory limitations on federal
district court jurisdiction: "Under the legislation of Congress, no court
of the United States could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify
the judgment for errors of [law]. . . .To do so would be an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts
is strictly original." 3" Hence, the Rooker doctrine bars federal district
courts from acting as appellate courts determining previously litigated
claims. In essence, this prevents the lower federal courts from taking
jurisdiction in a case where res judicata would bar the same action in
state court.3
8
The principle that the power of the federal district courts does not
include any acts of appellate jurisdiction, judicially expressed in
Rooker, can also be deduced from a purely statutory analysis. Sections
133139 and 134340 of Title 28, which set forth the actions in which the
31. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
32. Id. at 414.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 414-15.
35. Id. at 415.
36. Id. at 416.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. See text accompanying notes 8 1-124 infra.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) states:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
"(b) Except when express provision therefor is otherwise made in a statute of the United
States, where the plaintiff is finally adjudged to be entitled to recover less than the sum or
value of $ 10,000, computed without regard to any set off or counterclaim to which the de-
fendant may be adjudged to be entitled, and exclusive of interests and costs, the district
court may deny costs to the plaintiff and, in addition, may impose costs on the plaintiff."
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district courts have original jurisdiction, and section 1257,41 which de-
fines the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, together mandate
that the federal district courts may not exercise "appellate jurisdic-
tion"42 over state court judgments. This statutory basis of the Rooker
doctrine, however, has gone unrecognized by both courts43 and com-
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
"(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the depriva-
tion of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance
of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
"(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing
any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to
occur and power to prevent;
"(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
"(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Con-
gress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) provides: "Final judgments or decrees rendered by the
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court as follows:
"(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States and the decision is against its validity.
"(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favor of its validity.
"(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any
title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, trea-
ties, or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States."
42. See text accompanying notes 81-124 infra.
43. Many courts view Rooker as an alternative to res judicata rather than as a statu-
tory, jurisdictional bar. See, e.g., Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 425 (2d Cir. '1978);
Hutcherson v. Lahtin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96, 99 n.1 I
(3d Cir. 1973); Francisco Ent., Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481, 484-85 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974); Hanley v. Four Comers Vacation Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d 536,
538 (10th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (Ist Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 930 (1973); E.B. Elliot Adv. Co. v. Dade County, 425 F.2d 1141, 1148 (5th Cir.
1970); Davis v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Hilliard v. Pennsylvania,
308 F. Supp. 756, 760 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
Those courts properly noting the.jurisdictional basis of Rooker are Brown v. Chastain,
416 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); Sitton v. United States,
413 F.2d 1386, 1389 (5th Cir. 1969); Dade County Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Nathan, 413
F.2d 1005, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969); Pilkinton v. Pilkinton, 389 F.2d 32, 33 (8th Cir. 1968); Ash v.
Northern Ill. Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1966); Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281 F.2d
298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960) (citing Williams v. Tooke, 108 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 311
U.S. 655 (1940)); Maurice v. Board of Directors, 450 F. Supp. 755, 758 (E.D. Va. 1977);
Smiley v. South Dakota, 415 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D.S.D. 1976), af'd, 551 F.2d 774 (8th Cir.
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mentators.44 Instead, Rooker has been viewed as a judicially created
doctrine limited to its facts45 or to be narrowly construed in light of
other cases.46 These views ignore both the statutory bases of Rooker47
and the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review state
court judgments. 48 These interpretations confuse Rooker with res judi-
cata and imply that fundamental jurisdictional defects can be remedied
by exalting form over substance. A careful analysis of Rooker, how-
ever, reveals that its jurisdictional derivation clearly distinguishes it
from the non-jurisdictional concept of resjudicata.49 Indeed, mere ma-
nipulation of parties and pleadings cannot grant jurisdiction where
Rooker compels dismissal.50
1977); Malinou v. Cairns, 293 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (D.R.I. 1968); Manufacturers Record
Pub. Co. v. Lauer, 169 F. Supp. 234, 237 (E.D. La.), affid, 268 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1959).
44. See note 46 & accompanying text infra.
45. See, e.g., Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 1977) ("[Rooker] was not a case
like our instant case attacking a state statute as violative of the Federal Constitution under
§ 1983 and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief").
46. For example, various commentators characterize Rooker as identical to resjudicata
and thus repudiated by the "frivolous federal claim" doctrine of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946). The "frivolous claim" doctrine provides that a federal court will not dismiss a claim
based on the Constitution or federal statutes unless the claim is "[wiholly insubstantial and
frivolous." Id. at 682-83. See, e.g., Averitt, supra note 18: "Many of those courts denying
jurisdiction have done so in reliance on the elderly Supreme Court case of Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust. . . .This language is, however, probably only a figurative designation for res judi-
cata; and if not it appears to have been repudiated in Bell v. Hood." Id. at 198-99. See also
Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1018 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970)
(Rives, J., dissenting) (Bell limits Rooker). Others follow this view and argue that Rooker is
an "anachronism." See, e.g., Torke, supra note 11, at 546-47.
One commentator dismisses Rooker as an obvious result in light of the trivial nature of
the plaintiffs suit: "Since it appeared that Rooker's attack on the state judicial processes was
wholly frivolous, the Court probably reached a correct result." McCormack, supra note 18,
at 278. Professor McCormack argues that Rooker precludes a subsequent federal action
only if the federal claimant has a choice of forums and there are no procedural due process
claims involved, thus disagreeing with the basic jurisdictional premise of Rooker. "The cru-
cial point to be made at this state is that principles of federalism do not divest the federal
courts, in any constitutional or jurisdictional sense, of the power to relitigate issues that were
or could have been decided in prior state proceedings." Id. at 277. In accordance with this
view, it has been argued that Rooker jurisdictional defects can be remedied easily by amend-
ing the complaint. Developments, supra note 18, at 1133. Under this interpretation, dismis-
sal should occur only if it appears "on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff was seeking
appellate review of the state court judgment." Id. at 1334 n. 14.
47. See 263 U.S. at 416 ("[u]nder the legislation of Congress, no court of the United
States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment
for errors of that character").
48. See note 54 infra.
49. See text accompanying notes 107-24 infra.
50. Disguised appeals as well as attempts at direct review are prohibited under Rooker.
See Ash v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1966) (attempt at direct federal
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Statutory and System-Consistent Bases of Rooker
The Supreme Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction to Review State Court Judgments
The first principle on which the Rooker doctrine is founded is that
the Supreme Court is the only federal court that may review the judg-
ments of state courts.51 This principle is fundamental to our tradition
of federalism but nevertheless is often overlooked. Today, when reffl-
ing a claim in federal court may be almost an automatic response to an
unsatisfactory state court result, it is easy to forget how reluctantly the
states acquiesced to any federal review of state court judgments.5 2 The
power of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions, first chal-
lenged in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,53 has been attacked repeatedly.:5 4
In light of this history, sua sponte expansion of the jurisdictional power
of the lower federal courts is rendered patently unexplainable. 55
Consistency within the federal judicial system requires that the
Supreme Court have exclusive jurisdiction to review state court judg-
ments. Otherwise, the principles that currently restrict the Supreme
Court's powers of review over state court judgments: the highest state
court requirement,5 6 the time limitation on review,57 and the limitation
appeal); Zimring v. County of Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979)
(disguised appeal).
51. See 263 U.S. at 416. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
52. See note 54 infra.
53. 14 U.S. (I wheat.) 304 (1816). See generally Stolz, Federal Reevew of State Court
Decisions ofFederal Questions: The Need For Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L.
REV. 943, 946-48 (1976).
54. See Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CH.
L. REV. 1 (1964). "[Tlhe spirit of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions will not down [sic].
In crisis after crisis, from McCulloch v. Maryland to Baker v. Carr, every important decision
invalidating a state law has brought forth a rash of irresponsible proposals to limit the
Court's jurisdiction, to alter its procedures or composition, or to subject its decisions to re-
view by an unwieldy tribunal composed ofjudges from the courts of each of the fifty states.
South Carolina once prescribed criminal penalties for appealing state court decisions to the
Supreme Court. Others sought to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction over state judgments,
to require the concurrence of five of the then seven Justices to hold a state law invalid, or to
give appellate jurisdiction to the Senate whenever the validity of a state law was ques-
tioned." Id. at 5 & n.27.
55. Except for one unsuccessff-attempt, see note 74 infra, Congress has never granted
the lower federal courts appellate review over state court judgments. See authorities cited
note 51 supra. Furthermore, the lower federal courts cannot unilaterally expand their own
jurisdiction. See Zimring v. County of Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June 25,
1979). The jurisdiction of the federal courts thus is limited to that granted by Congress.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). See Currie, supra note 12, at 323: "I suspect that the
Supreme Court was chosen to review state court judgments because only it had sufficient
dignity to make federal review of state courts reasonably palatable; that the highest state-
court requirement was designed to preclude federal interference unless and until state courts
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of review to the state court record,5 8 would be totally undermined.
Thus, in terms of federalism-consistency, 59 the Supreme Court must
have the sole power to review state court judgments. 60
The Original Jurisdiction of the District Courts
The second principle upon which Rooker is based is the natural
corollary of exclusive review by the Supreme Court: the federal dis-
trict courts may exercise only "original" jurisdiction.6' As used in the
statutes, the term "original" jurisdiction is employed in direct contrast
to "appellate" jurisdiction. Furthermore, basic concepts of our judicial
process compel the result in Rooker. Even in the absence of the explicit
language of sections 1331 and 1343 of Title 28, all trial courts are inher-
ently limited to "original" jurisdiction over "original" acts. Without
this limitation, the decisionmaking function of the judicial system
would break down under the chaos of trial courts attacking each other's
judgments. To be "system-consistent," 62 courts of original jurisdiction
adjudicate only "original," and not "appellate," acts. As a matter of
"system-consistent" logic, federal district courts therefore cannot exer-
cise appellate jurisdiction over the trial courts of the states.
The term "original acts" means acts, such as automobile accidents,
breaches of contract, employment termination, and the like, that give
rise to legal claims. In contrast, appellate acts are events that occur
within the legal system: the decision of any court, even one of first re-
sort, is thus an "appellate act." Within the concept of appellate acts
had had a full opportunity to avoid that clash; and that the time limits on Supreme Court
review were meant to protect parties prevailing in state courts from stale challenges to their
judgments. If any of these surmises is accurate, Rooker is right."
57. If a litigant could "appeal" to a federal district court, the lack of a limitation on
appeals would subject the state decision to the perpetual possibility of reversal. See also
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 416.
58. "Appeals" to the federal court allow a second record to be created while § 1257
limits review to the state court record. Currie, supra note 12, at 324 (citing Foster v. Illinois.
332 U.S. 134, 135-36, 138 (1947)). For the problems created by such double records, see
generally Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978): Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977).
59. Federalism-consistency is to be distinguished from system-consistency. See text ac-
companying note 62 infra. "System-consistency" refers to the requirements imposed on deci-
sionmaking systems as a whole. "Federalism-consistency" refers to requirements that must
exist to make effective a dual system of federal and state courts.
60. See Currie, supra note 12, at 323-24.
61. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1976). See also Hanna v. Home Ins. Co., 281
F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1960); Malinou v. Cairns, 293 F. Supp. 1007. 1009 (D.R.I. 1968).
62. The term "system-consistent" refers to corollaries that follow from the require-
ments of a decisionmaking system. Thus, the requirement of finality dictates that the right
to appeal must be terminated at some point.
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there exists a distinction between declaration acts (acts of declaring
law) and process acts (the procedural manner in which the system
treats a litigant). Since the procedural manner in which the system
treats a litigant could constitute a separate claim; claims based on pro-
cedural abuses should not be dismissed under Rooker.63 Federal court
challenges to the substantive determinations of state court decisions
(declaration acts), however, are impermissible under Rooker.64 In such
a situation the federal claimant is seeking to appeal the state court
judgment to federal district court and permanently void the judgment
as to rulings on substantive issues. While persons may sue perpetrators
of "original acts" and "process acts," no one may sue a court on the
basis of an act of declaring law. Consequently, appellate acts declaring
substantive law may be corrected only by a higher court. Thus, in
Rooker, as in some recent cases,65 the losing party's claim that the state
court's declaration of law66 was a deprivation of constitutional rights
vested on the premise that "declaration acts" can create a cause of ac-
tion. The chaotic result of this faulty premise is easily demonstrated.
Assuming that appellate acts are equivalent to original acts and
that a trial court may be sued because of its decision, there would be
two methods available for challenging every decision: (1) the normal
63. Only factual or legal issues may be barred by res judicata if they are actually liti-
gated in the prior action. Thus, Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cer.
denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970), was incorrectly decided and should not have been dismissed on
Rooker grounds. In Brown, the federal claimant was not seeking to permanently annul the
judgment. She was seeking to vindicate her rights to procedural due process.
64. For cases where the federal claimant has been successful in voiding the state court's
declaration of substantive law, see Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 463 F. Supp. 473 (D.
Hawaii 1978) (state supreme court's determination of property rights held to be a denial of
substantive and procedural due process); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii
1977) (state supreme court's declaration of property law voided). Attacks to annul the re-
sults of a valid and final state court judgment are clearly impermissible "appeals" under
Rooker. For a proper resolution of these types of cases, see Smiley v. South Dakota, 551
F.2d 774, 775 (8th Cir. 1977) (citing Rooker for principle that federal district courts have no
jurisdiction to entertain attacks on a state court declaration of riparian rights); Ash v. North-
ern Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1966) (federal review of state eminent domain
proceedings dismissed); Maurice v. Board of Directors, 450 F. Supp. 755, 758 (E.D. Va.
1977) (attempt to set aside state court judgment on retirement benefits disallowed on Rooker
grounds); Zimring v. County of Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979)
(disguised appeal).
65. See general l Smiley v. South Dakota, 551 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1977); Sotomura v.
County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp.
559 (D. Hawaii 1977); Zimring v..County of Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June
25, 1979).
66. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977) (the state court's
declaration of law allegedly constituted a "taking" of property).
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channel of appeal to the next highest court of the jurisdiction; and (2)
collateral attack by filing suit in another trial court against the previous
judge or other officials responsible for enforcement of the decision. 67
The theory of the second suit might be, for example, that the prior deci-
sion was an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due proc-
ess of law.68 Unorthodox as it may seem, this theory has been
successful in recent cases, 69 implying that trial court decisions can be
attacked in a second trial court under a claim of denial of due prpcess.
Furthermore, the second court's decision logically could be attacked in
a third trial court, and so on.70
Accordingly, it is system-inconsistent to argue that appellate acts
be considered the equivalent of "original" acts. As a decisionmaking
process, the judicial system must require finality at some point in
time.71 Appeals, of course, do not upset the requirement of finality.
67. Gipson v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 558 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1977) (attorney disci-
pline case); Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
834 (1977) (attorney discipline case); Adkins v. Underwood, 520 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) (justices sued for error in judgment); Tang v. New York
Supreme Court, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); Roy v. Jones,
484 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1973) (suit against state supreme court); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar
Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970) (attorney discipline case); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d
1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970) (procedural due process claim against
judges ofjuvenile court); Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1955) (state supreme
court sued for "derelictive" jurisprudence); Olitt v. Murphy, 453 F. Supp. 354, (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (suspension proceeding). But see Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii
1977), where the state supreme court was not named as a defendant, but the court's decision
was the basis for the constitutional claim.
68. See generally Smiley v. South Dakota, 551 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1977) (state court
decision on riparian rights an alleged denial of due process); Adkins v. Underwood, 520
F.2d 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) (state supreme court's decision on
joinder of parties alleged to violate due process clause of fourteenth amendment); Ash v.
Northern Ill. Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1966) (state court exclusion of evidence alleged
to lead to procedural due process violation); Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp.
473 (D. Hawaii 1978) (Hawaii Supreme Court alleged to be wrong on shoreline boundary
issue; "taking" alleged); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977) (Hawaii
Supreme Court alleged to be wrong on water rights; "taking" asserted); Zimring v. County
of Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979) (Hawaii Supreme Court al-
leged to be wrong on case of first impression).
69. See, e.g., Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. (D. Hawaii 1978); Robinson
v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977).
70. Not only could state trial and appellate decisions be attacked as unconstitutional in
federal court, there is also some authority that allegedly unconstitutional federal district
court decisions could be attacked in state trial courts. Since state courts have jurisdiction
over civil rights claims, they conceivably could enjoin federal officials to protect and effectu-
ate their judgments. See generaly P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 427-31 (2d ed.
1973).
71. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931); RE-
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Equating original acts with appellate acts, however, would destroy the
principle of finality. Moreover, because state courts have jurisdiction
under section 1983, there is no compelling reason to assume that state
trial courts could not review federal judgments as well as having fed-
eral review of state court judgments.72 Thus, decisions by a federal
court could be subject to the same lack of finality as those arising from
state judgments.
Statutory Limitations on the District Courts
The statutory limitation of "original" jurisdiction is the third basis
for the Rooker doctrine. The federal district courts, as courts of limited
jurisdiction,73 have only that jurisdiction which Congress determines is
appropriate. Congress has yet to give the lower federal courts jurisdic-
tion to review state court judgments.74 This limitation is an obvious
statutory corollary of the statutory grant to the Supreme Court of ex-
clusive power to review state court judgments. The term "original" as
used in the statutes clearly negates, as a matter of statutory construc-
tion, any implied "appellate" jurisdiction.
There are thus three rationales supporting the Rooker doctrine.
Two are statutory: the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
review state court judgments under section 1257 of Title 28,75 and the
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 15, Comments a, b & c, at 122-27 (Tent. Draft No.
5, 1978)- Note, Filling the Void- Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L. J. 164, 192-95 (1977). See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus For State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
72. See note 70 supra.
73. See, e.g., Malinou v. Cairns, 293 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (D.R.I. 1968).
74. One situation where Congress did attempt to grant review of state court judgments
to federal district courts is explained in Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of
Federal Questions: The Need For Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943
(1976). "In 1863 Congress provided for removal of certain cases to a circuit court before or
after judgment in a state court with explicit provision for retrial of the facts and law in the
circuit court. . . .That was properly held unconstitutional as violating the seventh amend-
ment with respect to facts tried before a state court jury. . . .Although the statute was also
applicable in non-jury cases, the Supreme Court declared it 'void' and it apparently was not
utilized thereafter." Id. at 947-48 n.22.
One authority has asserted that the power of Congress to vest the lower federal courts
with appellate jurisdiction over state courts has "never been doubted." H. FRIENDLY, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEw 49 (1973). After National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), however, some doubt surely must exist. In that case, the Supreme
Court indicated that Congress is not free to interfere with the states' integral governmental
functions. Id. at 855. It is difficult to conceive of a state function more integral than dispute
resolution through a court system. Moreover, the tenth amendment would appear to consti-
tute a substantial obstacle to any federal attempt to review questions of state law.
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
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grant of original jurisdiction to the federal district courts in sections
133176 and 1343.77 The third rationale is non-statutory: if trial courts
could readily annul the judgments of each other on the merits, the pre-
requisite of finality in the judicial system would be destroyed. This is
the system-consistency basis of Rooker. Because Congress has been ex-
plicit when it has chosen to vest the power of review, 78 the lower fed-
eral courts cannot, in the absence of congressional action, enlarge their
jurisdiction. Moreover, it is equally true that the Supreme Court can-
not, explicitly or implicitly, grant to the lower federal courts its exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review state court judgments.79
These principles of original federal district court jurisdiction and
exclusive Supreme Court review are, like Rooker, somewhat self-evi-
dent. The difficult question, however, is ascertaining the scope of
Rooker by identifying the instances in which a federal court impermis-
sibly is acting "directly. . .or indirectly" 80 as an appellate court of a
state.
The Scope of Rooker Preclusion: Res Judicata Congruity
In the last decade, the federal courts frequently have cited
Rooker;8' however, the scope of the Rooker preclusion of claims and
issues has been often misunderstood.8 2 On many occasions the applica-
76. Id. § 1331 (1976).
77. Id. § 1343. See Sitton v. United States, 413 F.2d 1386, 1389 (5th Cir. 1969); Ash v.
Northern Ill. Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1966).
78. See Currie, supra note 12, at 322 (citing statutes granting the courts of appeal juris-
diction to review final orders of administrative agencies). See also UMC Indus. Inc. v. Sea-
borg, 439 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1971). "It is well settled that if Congress, as here, specifically
designates a forum for judicial review of administrative action, that forum is exclusive, and
this result does not depend upon the use of the word 'exclusive' in the statute." Id. at 955.
79. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 274 (1957). See also Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) ("Under the legislation of Congress" only the Supreme
Court can review state decisions). See generally Choper, The Scope of National Power vis-a-
vis the States. The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L. J. 1552 (1977) (Congress is a
better forum for resolving fundamental federalism questions).
The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976), is considered as an excep-
tion to § 1257. See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See Currie, supra note
13, at 323-24 n.50. However, this does not imply that §§ 1331 and 1343 are also exceptions
to the exclusive jurisdiction to review state court judgments. If they did indeed constitute
exceptions to § 1257, Supreme Court review under § 1257 would be destroyed altogether.
Currie, supra note 13, at 322-23.
80. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
81. See, e.g., Smiley v. South Dakota, 551 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1977); Getty v. Reed, 547
F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1977); Adkins v. Underwood, 520 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1017 (1975); Tang v. New York Supreme Court, 487 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
82. Some courts have argued that Rooker applies only to claims actually raised and
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tion of Rooker has been confused with the doctrine ofresjudicata.8 3 In
the following three cases the federal courts were asked to review a prior
state court judgment and should have dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
under the Rooker doctrine.
In Getty v. Reed, 4 Getty, an attorney, was disbarred on the
grounds that he had used abusive conduct and speech in several state
court trials. After hearing argument and considering a record compiled
by a trial panel, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed a recommenda-
tion to disbar Getty. Getty thereafter turned to federal district court
seeking injunctive relief under section 1983. The federal court applied
the Rooker doctrine and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.8 5 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, however, emphasizing that Getty
was attacking the constitutionality of a state statute and was raising
substantial first amendment claims. The court distinguished Rooker as
applying only where the federal district court obviously did not have
jurisdiction.8 6
Sylvander v. New England Homefor Little Wanderers87 involved a
Massachusetts law authorizing the probate court in certain instances to
compel separation of a child from its mother without the mother's con-
sent. Sylvander refused to consent to give up her child and the Home
successfully petitioned a state probate judge for an order of separation.
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the
probate judge's decision and found the state statute constitutional. Syl-
vander did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court but
instead filed an action in federal district court alleging a claim under
section 1983. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's dismissal; however, res judicata,88 not Rooker, was the basis for
the cburt's decision.
voluntarily litigated. See Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 1977); Jack's Fruit Co.
v. Growers Mktg. Serv., 488 F.2d 493, 494 (5th Cir. 1973); Tang v. New York Supreme
Court, 487 F.2d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); Hanley v. Four
Comers Vacation Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973). These views are incor-
rect. Rooker would bar all claims that would be precluded under the res judicata law of the
state. See text accompanying note 108 infra. Thus, even the Court's language in Rooker,
which indicates the action is barred only "[i]f the constitutional questions stated in the bill
actually arose in the cause," is not accurate. 263 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
83. See cases cited note 43 supra.
84. 547 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1977).
85. Getty v. Reed, 413 F. Supp. 511, 514 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
86. 547 F.2d at 976.
87. 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978).
88. Id. at 1107.
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Similarly, in Cornwell v. Ferguson,8 9 a teacher argued unsuccess-
fully before a university personnel committee that denial of his tenure
violated his first amendment rights. He then petitioned a state appel-
late court to review the action and simultaneously filed suit in federal
court. The federal court stayed further action pending the outcome of
the state court proceedings. After reviewing the record, the state court
denied certiorari to the administrative action, and no further state ap-
peals were taken from this adverse determination. When Cornwell re-
turned to federal court, his action was held to be barred by res judicata.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 90
These three typical cases illustrate that the same questions that
arise in the application of res judicata9 ' arise as well under Rooker:
Does the Rooker doctrine bar claims that could have been, but were
not raised in state court?92 Does it bar claims, such as in Cornwell,
where the state court has not expressed an opinion on the constitutional
claim?93 Does it bar claims involving different defendants or different
plaintiffs?94 Is a civil rights action under section 1983, as were all three
cases discussed above, an exception to Rooker preclusion?95 As in
89. 545 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1977).
90. Id. at 1026.
91. See Currie, supra note 12.
92. See cases cited note 82 supra.
93. The Rooker question of whether claims not explicity decided in the state court
action are barred in a subsequent action is analogous to the debate concerning the scope of
res judicata. The courts have not uniformly decided the question of whether constitutional
claims implicitly determined by a state judgment are forever barred by res judicata. For
cases holding that implicit determinations are a bar, see Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281
U.S. 470, 477-78 (1930); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 1978); Red Fox v. Red
Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 364 (9th Cir. 1977); Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Ill., 557 F.2d 122,
124-25 (7th Cir. 1977). But see the following cases stating that unraised claims, not explicitly
decided, are not barred: Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327, 1329 (2d Cir. 1977); Newman v.
Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 277, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); Lombard v.
Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975).
94. Almost all litigants who seek an appeal of their adverse state court judgment add
new defendants in the federal action. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923)
(addition of two defendants not significant). State officials responsible for enforcing the
decision usually are added as federal defendants, a typical case being Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977), where the governor and land commission members were
added. Cases discussing the lack of significance of new defendants in the res judicata con-
text include Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414, 426 (2d Cir. 1978); Duncan v. Town of Blacks-
burg, 364 F. Supp. 643, 645 (W.D. Va. 1973).
The addition of new defendants has never been significant in cases decided under
Rooker. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 203 U.S. 413, 414 (1923); Smiley v. South Da-
kota, 551 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1977); Adkins v. Underwood, 520 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975).
95. See generally Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1977) (§ 1983 claim
barred by Younger, Rooker mentioned); Smiley v. South Dakota, 551 F.2d 774, 776 (8th Cir.
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Getty, does Rooker bar a federal claimant who was an involuntary de-
fendant in a state court proceeding?96 Finally, as in Cornwell, what of
the federal plaintiff who is sent to state court under the doctrine of
abstention?97
In answering these questions, the meaning of the Rooker doctrine
must be emphasized: federal courts are prohibited from acting "di-
rectly . . . or indirectly" as appellate courts of the states.98 Accord-
ingly, neither the form nor language of the complaint,99 nor the
alignment of the parties °° should prevail over the substance of the
claim in analyzing whether an action is an appeal or an original
claim.' 0' Thus, "disguised" appeals 0 2 and facially obvious requests for
review should be prohibited. The vast majority of federal actions to
annul state court judgments, however, incorporate legal theories, 0 3
causes of action,' °4 and parties different from the state court suit,105
1977) (Rooker grounds; § 1983 claim noted); Adkins v. Underwood, 520 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) (§ 1983 claim barred; Rooker noted); Tang v. New York
Supreme Court, 487 F.2d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974) (§ 1983
claim barred by Rooker). Rooker properly bars a § 1983 claim which was raised or could
have been raised in the state proceedings. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra. For
expressions to the contrary, see New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764, 772, 773-74
nn.50-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d
631, 635 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975); Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285,
1288 (9th Cir. 1971).
96. See generally Averitt, supra note 18, at 196, see also Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway &
Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1978); Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1977);
Mack v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry, 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971).
97. See New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
894 (1978); Olitt v. Murphy, 453 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
98. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 416.
99. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977) (complaint alleged
that state supreme court decision "took" plaintiffs property in violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
100. See note 94 supra.
101. Contra, Developments, supra note 18, at 1334 n.14 (pleadings can be easily
amended to avoid Rooker question).
102. See, e.g., Ash v. Northern 111. Gas Co., 362 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1966) (plaintiffs
in effect asking district court to exercise appellate jurisdiction); Zimring v. Hawaii, Civ. No.
79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979) (attempt to litigate issue under the "guise" of origi-
nal action). See also Frazier v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Dist., 363 F.2d 861 (5th Cir.
1966) (plaintiff captioned federal action as an "application for judicial review").
103. See cases cited note 95 supra.
104. See cases cited note 65 supra.
105. See cases cited note 94 supra.
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making it difficult to determine whether a claim actually is a disguised
appeal.
In determining the attributes of an "appeal," the threshold step is
to compare the nature of an "appeal" with the characteristics of an
"original" action. Essentially, an appeal is any claim that could not be
brought as an original action because it is barred by a previous judg-
ment. The action is barred because it is founded upon the same claim
set forth in the original action. Since it cannot be refiled as an original
action, the proper procedure for seeking relief is to take an appeal.
This inquiry closely resembles the analysis underlying the doctrine
of bar and merger (claim preclusion) in res judicata. 106 Claims barred
by res judicata similarly cannot be brought again as original actions.' 0 7
The congruence between res judicata and Rooker thus is apparent: any
action barred by res judicata would also be barred by Rooker. Thus, a
claim brought in federal court based upon a state court judgment dis-
posing of the same claim would constitute an "appeal" of the state
court judgment. Moreover, any action not barred by res judicata
would not be barred by Rooker because it would not involve the same
claim. With no appeal involved, the federal court would have original
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the preclusion of claims under Rooker is identical in
scope to the claim preclusion under res judicata. There is nothing star-
tling about this congruity because the scope of the definition of "claim"
under state law determines whether a second action in federal court is
the same claim and thus is barred by res judicata.10 8 This same defini-
tion of "claim" also applies in determining whether a second action
would be an appeal and thus prohibited by Rooker. 0 9 Hence, under
Rooker and res judicata, the federal courts must look to what consti-
tutes a "claim" in the state that rendered the allegedly preclusive state
court judgment.
It may appear that two labels, Rooker and res judicata, are being
used to describe the same idea. One might argue that Rooker simply
stands for the principle that the federal court must apply res judicata if
the state court would do so. 110 But Rooker and res judicata historically
106. See note 20 supra.
107. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, Explanatory Notes §§ 61-
61.2, at 138-204 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
108. See Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183 (1941).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). See text accompanying note 118 infra.
110. In other words, Rooker can be viewed as changing the concept of res judicata.
Rooker implies that res judicata can never be waived. A federal court must look to the law
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have been treated differently as to the force of their application.
Rooker, because it is derived from statutory limitations on federal
district court power," ' I is a jurisdictional doctrine.' 12 Where applicable,
Rooker holds that the federal court simply has no jurisdiction and must
therefore dismiss the action" 3 even if the issue is not raised by a party.
On the other hand, res judicata, as an affirmative defense," 14 is waived
unless raised in a timely fashion.' 5 It is not a jurisdictional doctrine
because a court must assume that it has jurisdiction before considering
the defense of res judicata. Moreover, the application of res judicata is
subject to exceptions,' 6 clearly indicating that it is not jurisdictional.
In essence, however, there are not two doctrines, one a jurisdic-
tional bar and the other a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense, but
only one doctrine, a jurisdictional type of res judicata. Because the
scope of Rooker preclusion is identical to the scope of claim preclusion
under res judicata, as a practical matter there is no separate Rooker
doctrine. Instead of treating Rooker and res judicata- as two separate
doctrines, one jurisdictional and the other a waivable affirmative de-
fense, the two could be combined to constitute a single non-waivable
jurisdictional doctrine of res judicata, bar and merger. Since Rooker
has long been in usage as a distinct concept, however, Rooker and res
judicata will be discussed herein as separate doctrines.' 7
Once the relationship between Rooker and res judicata is under-
stood, the scope of Rooker's jurisdictional preclusion may be deter-
mined by the res judicata law of the rendering state. The obligation to
look to state law thus becomes clear. In res judicata terms, the "full
of the state which rendered the judgment and, if res judicata would be applied by the courts
of that state, the federal court must dismiss the action.
111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1354, 1257 (1976). See text accompanying notes 18-23 SUpra.
112. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. at 416.
113. See Currie, supra note 12, at 324.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
115. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607, n.19 (1976).
116. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948) (problems of applying resjudi-
cata in tax cases); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (patent
and antitrust case); Spilker v. Hankin, 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (breach of attorney's
fiduciary duty). But see Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) ("[W]e are aware of no
principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary
principle of res judicata"). See generally Torke, supra note 11, at 559-68.
117. The result would be the same whether Rooker and res judicata were discussed as
one integrated doctrine or as two separate doctrines; only the terminology used in this Arti-
cle would have to be changed. The focus of this Article, however, is to explain how the
scope of Rooker's jurisdictional preclusion is determined by the res judicata law of the ren-
dering state and not how the effect of state res judicata law is governed by Rooker's jurisdic-
tional basis.
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faith and credit" statute 18 requires the federal court to apply the law of
the judgment-rendering state to determine preclusion. Under Rooker,
the limitation that a federal court may not act as an appellate court
requires the federal court to look to the law of the state in question to
determine whether it would be acting impermissibly as an appellate
court. The state's res judicata law would indicate whether or not it is
exercising appellate functions.
Under both res judicata and Rooker, the federal court is com-
pelled to act as if it were a court of the state in question, a result similar
to that reached in diversity cases under the Erie doctrine. " 9 Thus, as to
the three cases noted earlier°20-Gety, Sylvander and Cornwell-the
federal courts were obligated to look to the claim preclusion law of the
rendering state to determine whether to dismiss the action. Moreover,
because Rooker is jurisdictional it commands dismissal, and any dis-
cussion of res judicata is superfluous. Over the past decade many
courts have reached the correct Rooker result for the wrong res judicata
reason. 121
Thus, the potentially difficult questions of different parties, differ-
ent claims and whether section 1983 actions constitute an exception to
preclusion under Rooker must be answered by tracking state res judi-
cata law. Where state law is not clear,122 Rooker creates difficult
problems of predicting how state courts would rule. 23 An absence of
clarity, however, does not imply that federal courts are free to apply a
general federal common law.12 4
118. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439-40 (1943); Currie, supra
note 12 at 326-27. The federal court must apply the res judicata law of the state rendering
the judgment. See Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183
(1941); Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939). Seegener-
ally Comment, Res Judicata in the Federal Courts. Appleation of Federal or State Law. Pos-
sible Differences Between the Two, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 96 (1965).
119. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Professor Degnan argues that it is not
Erie but rather § 1738 which commands this result in diversity cases. See Degnan, Federal-
ized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 750-55 (1976).
120. See text accompanying notes 84-90 sufpra.
121. E.g., Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d 1103 (1st
Cir. 1978); Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1978); Ellentuck v. Klein, 570 F.2d 414
(2d Cir. 1978); Cornwell v. Ferguson, 545 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1977).
122. See McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1157 (2d Cir. 1975) (vacating and remanding
case so that parties can develop record on New York law).
123. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1258.
124. Thus, the argument for a "special res judicata" is not valid. But see Torke, supra
note 11, at 568 (arguing for an exception to res judicata). Such cases as Graves v. Olgiati,
550 F.2d 1327, 1329 (2d Cir. 1977) (state res judicata law noted as not controlling); Newman
v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 277, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975) (federal law
noted as controlling); and Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
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Application of the Rooker Doctrine
Three short hypotheticals best illustrate the application of the
Rooker doctrine. Suppose State X has a rule against splitting causes of
action; hence, a "claim" is defined by a "transaction" or "fact-group-
ings" test125 as opposed to a "primary rights" test.12 6
A, a resident of State X, is an untenured professor at a public uni-
versity in State X who has been denied tenure on the basis that he or
she allegedly failed to meet the university's publications requirement
for tenure. A files an action in the courts of State X alleging two
claims: first, that the denial of tenure was "arbitrary and capricious";
and second, that the discharge was precipatated by A's criticism of uni-
versity policy in violation of his or her first amendment rights. 127 A
loses on both grounds and the judgment is' affirmed by the supreme
court of X, which issues a written opinion.
If A were to file suit in federal district court asserting a cause of
action under section 1983, the federal court should, if asked by the de-
fendants, apply the doctrine of res judicata.128 Because A's federal
court claims are the same as those litigated in state court, res judicata
would require dismissal. In the event the defendants fail to raise the
state court judgment as a bar to the federal action, the court should
examine whether the federal action is the equivalent of an appeal of the
state court judgment. As the same legal theories that were asserted in
the state court action are being asserted in federal court, the action is
clearly one seeking to reverse or annul the effects of the state court
judgment. Obviously, every definition of a claim would treat identical
suits as the same action. If the court assumed jurisdiction it would be
acting as an appellate court of the state. Thus, the court has no juris-
diction and must dismiss under Rooker.
As a second example, suppose that in state court, A raises both an
"arbitrary and capricious" claim and a first amendment claim. Sup-
pose further that both the state trial and supreme court holdings refer
only to the "arbitrary and capricious" claim, and that the state supreme
court opinion cites only that ground in affirming the lower court's judg-
denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975) (§ 1738 ignored, § 1983 considered an exception to resjudicata),
improperly ignore the controlling effect of § 1738.
125. See generall, CASAD, RES JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL 24-30 (1976); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
126. See generall CASAD, REs JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL 21-23 (1976).
127. The facts of this hypothetical are based loosely on Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825
(8th Cir. 1965) (res judicata applied to bar subsequent federal action).
128. See Jenson v. Olson, 353 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1965).
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ment of dismissal. A then files in federal court under section 1983, rais-
ing only the first amendment claim. Under either Rooker or res
judicata, the result would be the same: A's first amendment claim is
barred. In applying the defense of res judicata, section 1738129 re-
quires130 the federal court to give the judgment the same effect as
would a court in State X. The judgment against A constituted an im-
plicit determination of all claims.' 3' A's first amendment claim was
raised but simply not discussed in the state court opinions. Thus, the
judgment against A was an adverse determination on the first amend-
ment issue. The state court judgment in the second hypothetical has
the same force and effect as the judgment in the previous example. Res
judicata, if raised, bars the separate filing of a first amendment action
in federal court. Under a Rooker analysis the subsequent federal suit
would be characterized as an attempt to annul or reverse an issue al-
ready decided by the state court judgment. Although only implicitly
determined, the state courts obviously ruled against A's first amend-
ment claim in rendering their adverse judgment. Thus, the federal ac-
tion is merely an attempt to seek review of that implicit determination
of the first amendment claim, and under Rooker the federal court must
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 32
As a third illustration, assume A does not raise a first amendment
claim in the state courts, but simply confines his or her case to the alle-
gation that the denial of tenure was arbitrary and capricious. Further
assume that the judgment rendered against A by the state trial court is
affirmed by the state supreme court, whereupon A files suit in federal
court raising the first amendment claim for the first time. If res judicata
is properly raised as a defense, the federal court must dismiss the ac-
tion. A should have brought both claims at once, and section 1738 re-
quires the federal court to apply State Xs rule prohibiting the splitting
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
130. See Currie, supra note 12, at 326 ("federal respect for state court judgments is...
the command of Congress).
131. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876): "[T]hat ajudgment estops
not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also
as to every ground which might have been presented, is strictly accurate .... ." See also
Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 477 (1929); Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Ill..
557 F.2d 122, 124-25 (7th Cir. 1977); Tang v. New York Supreme Court, 487 F.2d 138, 141
n.2 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
132. Because the state court has implicitly decided the issue, any consideration of that
question by a federal court would place that court in the position of acting as an appellate
court of the state. Under Rooker, the federal court has no jurisdiction to do so. See 263
U.S. at 415.
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of causes of action. 33 A cannot now bring a separate first amendment
claim in either state or federal court. Under a Rooker analysis, the
same result once again is reached. When presented with the first
amendment claim, the federal court must determine whether it repre-
sents an attempt to appeal any part of a final state decision. The first
amendment claim in this case is just as much an attempt to "appeal"
the state court judgment as in the previous examples. Because of State
Xs rule against splitting causes of action, the state court judgment was
a judgment on all claims that could have been raised from this set of
facts. In other words, the first amendment claim was "decided" against
A, although it was never explicitly raised in the original action. The
filing of the federal action simply constituted an attempted appeal of
part of that decision.
Although the results under Rooker may seem harsh, they are sim-
ply applications of the state's policy against splitting causes of action.
The federal court is bound to follow that policy and has no power to
pass on the wisdom of such a rule.134 Under the three reasons set forth
earlier: the Supreme Court's exclusive federal power of reviewing state
court judgments, 35 the intent of Congress not to grant federal district
courts appellate jurisdiction, 36 and the system-consistency of the dis-
trict courts' power to review only original facts, 137 the federal courts in
the previous hypotheticals may not review a state court judgment by
entertaining the first amendment claim. Instead, they must dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.
These examples also imply that Rooker principles apply to courts
of the same jurisdiction considering the effects of their respective judg-
ments. Suppose A, in the third hypothetical, filed his or her first
amendment claim in a second trial court of State X. Obviously, res
judicata would apply to bar the action. Moreover, unlike the state-fed-
eral situations, the applicability of res judicata appears obvious, and
that doctrine, not Rooker, usually would be the basis for dismissal.
If one were to examine the statutes and constitution of State X,
one most likely would find jurisdictional principles and rules similar to
sections 1257 and 1331 to 1343 of Title 28, implying that state trial
courts have no appellate jurisdiction and that the state appellate courts
133. See generally Currie, supra note 12, at 326-27.
134. Id.
135. See text accompanying notes 51-60 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 61-72 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 73-79 supra.
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shall have the sole authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction. 38 This
would be one source of imputing the limitations of the Rooker doctrine
to state trial courts attacking the judgments of sister trial courts of the
same state. In addition to possible statutory limitations on appellate
jurisdiction, the system-consistency rationale of Rooker also would ap-
ply to courts within the same state. System-consistency implies that a
state trial court of original jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate court
of a similar trial court. Otherwise, there would be two avenues of ap-
peal for every trial decision with the attendant lack of finality and dis-
ruption of the appellate system. Thus, where res judicata bars a second
action, the Rooker doctrine, as an inherent jurisdictional principle, also
applies. Rooker, as well as res judicata, has vitality in such same-state
situations. Hence, in both state-federal and same-state situations,
Rooker and res judicata operate to compel identical claim preclusion
effects. However, res judicata traditionally has been viewed as a waiv-
able defense, while Rooker requires dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds.
Neither res judicata nor Rooker would bar a subsequent suit in
federal court that state law would recognize as a distinct and separate
claim. In the previous example, for instance, if State X allowed split-
ting of legal theories and if A had not raised a constitutional claim in
state court, such a claim could be raised in federal court. No jurisdic-
tional principle would bar A's access to federal court. Under the doc-
trines of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, however, A may be es-
topped from litigating certain legal and factual questions that were de-
termined against him or her in state court. The obligation to apply
state collateral estoppel principles is also derived from the requirement
that the federal court give prior state court judgments the same force
and effect that they would have in the rendering state. 139
The equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel is applied more flex-
ibly than either Roocker or bar and merger. It applies only to issues that
138. Cf CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 10 (West Supp. 1980) ("[sluperior courts have original
jurisdiction in all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts"); id. § II ("courts
of appeal have appellate jurisdiction when superior courts have original jurisdiction and in
other causes prescribed by statute. Superior courts have appellate jurisdiction in causes pre-
scribed by statute that arise in municipal and justice courts in their counties"). See CAL.
RULES CT. 29(a) (specifies grounds for hearing in the supreme court).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). Because § 1738 commands the federal courts to give a
state judgment the same full faith and credit to which it is entitled in the courts of the
rendering state, the federal court must bar relitigation of issues that would be barred by the
state's law of collateral estoppel. But see American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688,
690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (competing federal policies outweighed
policies of collateral estoppel).
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were litigated, decided by the court, and necessary to the judgment,
although various tests may establish these elements. 40 In addition,
other policy-based restrictions may affect the application of collateral
estoppel.14'
Federal courts are not free to disregard the collateral estoppel ef-
fect of prior state courtjudgments: section 1738 commands that federal
courts apply the law of the state which rendered the prior judgment
however rigid or flexible. 142 Recent Second Circuit decisions adopting
a general federal common law of res judicata and collateral estoppel
are thus incorrect. 143 Those federal courts that argue for developing
their own rules of collateral estoppel do so on the assumption that su-
perior federal policies, embodied in statutes, are implicit exceptions to
section 1738.144 Rooker and section 1738, however, obligate the federal
courts to follow state law as to both claim and issue preclusion. Their
failure to do so has been the greatest recurring weakness of the federal
system. The federal courts have neither looked to state law to decide
claim and issue preclusion nor offered an explanation for their failure
to do so. 145
Because of the power of state courts to define a claim, Rooker and
section 1738 potentially subordinate large areas of federal jurisdiction
140. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 563-71 (2d ed. 1977).
141. See generally Averitt, supra note 18, at 211 (res judicata limited in tax and tariff
litigation); Torke, supra note 11, at 561-66 (discussing exceptions to res judicata involving
tax, employment discrimination, and bankruptcy cases).
142. On the other hand, Professor Currie suggests arguments as to how federal courts
may give greater preclusion effect to the judgments of state courts than allowed under state
law. The same arguments could be made as to collateral estoppel. See Currie, supra note
12, at 326-27.
143. See Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327, 1329 (2d Cir. 1977) (claims not explicitly
raised are not barred); Newman v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 277, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 1004 (1975) (same); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631, 635-37 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975) (§ 1738 ignored; § 1983 considered an exception to
res judicata). See also Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978)
(state res judicata law ignored); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977)
(state res judicata law not applied because of an alleged procedural due process violation).
But see McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1157 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting obligation to apply
state law).
144. For a general discussion of the view supporting a § 1983 exception to res judicata,
see Lauchli v. United States, 405 U.S. 965 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Averitt, supra
note 18, at 211-16; Torke, supra note 11, at 552-66. But see Currie, supra note 12, at 327-50
(lack of exceptions to res judicata noted).
145. Seegeneraly Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); Phelps v. Harris,
101 U.S. 370 (1879); Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327, 1329 (2d Cir. 1977) (ignoring § 1738);
Newman v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 277, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975)
(federal law controlling). But see McCune v. Frank, 521 F.2d 1152, 1157 (2d Cir. 1975)
(remanding to state court to determine what state res judicata law requires).
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to state law. Since state courts have the power to define what consti-
tutes a claim, they have the potential for further limiting federal juris-
diction. 146 This state court "control" of federal jurisdiction may appear
unacceptable because of the view that the federal courts are considered
as the primary institutions to enforce constitutional and federal
rights. 147 Nevertheless, state res judicata law precludes federal jurisdic-
tion in these cases because a state court that properly assumed jurisdic-
tion acted first. Where state courts have personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, their final judgments are entitled to respect by all other
courts, state and federal. 148 As long as the federal claimant had an ade-
quate opportunity to be heard in state court, the state court judgment is
final. A final state court judgment is a signal that the judicial system as
a whole, both state and federal, has spoken with finality. 149 This final-
ity is evidenced as much by the failure of the United States Supreme
Court to review a state court judgment as by a grant of certiorari and a
subsequent decision.
This principle of giving absolute finality to state court decisions
has not always been supported by federal courts. 150 The primary fear
of these courts has been that some state courts would not grant an ade-
quate opportunity to litigate federal claims. A claim premised on a
procedural due process violation, however, would not be barred by
Rooker because it involves "process acts," a different set of "original"
facts.' 5' As a separate cause of action, a procedural due process viola-
146. The trend toward a more expansive definition of "claim" has meant that larger
chunks of legal issues are precluded by state judgments under res judicata. See Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 327 (1971). One
court has noted that the unthinking application of res judicata may make the civil rights acts
a "dead letter." Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971).
147. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (§ 1983 is an expressly authorized
exception to the anti-injunction statute).
148. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
149. Note, Filling the Void- Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on Judgments, 87
YALE L.J. 164, 188-89 (1977).
150. See Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1093 (1974) (Oakes, J., dissenting); Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473
(D. Hawaii 1978); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977) (state supreme
court allegedly violated procedural due process by failing to allow rehearing on the issue of
the constitutionality of the decision itself). See generally Averitt, supra note 18, at 193-94;
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
151. If the judicial process treats a litigant in such a way that he or she is not given a fair
opportunity to be heard, his or her fourteenth amendment right to procedural due process
has been violated. He or she then should have the right to invalidate the judgment and
repeat the judicial process with the defect corrected. However, the court invalidating the
judgment should not have the right to substitute its own judgment on the substantive issue.
This is the thrust of Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 (1930).
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tion would not be precluded by res judicata or Rooker, although such
claims may be dismissed under collateral estoppel' 52 or equitable prin-
ciples such as the Younger doctrine.15 3
Applicability of the Rooker Doctrine to Section 1983 Civil
Rights Actions
In recent years the vast majority of cases raising the issues dis-
cussed herein have involved federal claimants asserting constitutional
claims 54 under section 1983 in seeking to have final state court judg-
ments set aside. Rooker has not figured prominently in the discus-
sion. 55 Rather, the debate has focused on whether res judicata bars a
subsequent section 1983 action in federal court. Most of the courts con-
sidering the question have applied res judicata, 56 although the obliga-
tion to look to state law under section 1738 has not often been explicitly
noted. 57 The relevant question here is whether the arguments made
for a section 1983 exception to res judicata also support a section 1983
exception to the Rooker preclusion principle.
On occasion courts have refused or hesitated to apply res judicata
to bar a civil rights claim. In one case, the Ninth Circuit stated that to
For other cases making this distinction regarding procedural due process claims, see
Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978); Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977); Zimring v. Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed
June 25, 1979).
152. For example, there are a number of cases where a convicted criminal defendant
may recover for violations of civil rights on the ground that perjured testimony was used to
convict. Because a § 1983 claim does not seek to set aside the conviction, it constitutes a
separate cause of action and is not precluded by the doctrine of bar and merger. See Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). However, collateral estoppel often is applied. See Mas-
tracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975) (§ 1983
damages action alleging use of perjured testimony barred by collateral estoppel); Metros v.
United States Dist. Court, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1970) (§ 1983 action brought seeking
damages for violation of the fourth amendment barred by collateral estoppel). But see Ney
v. California, 438 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971) (conviction alone cannot bar subsequent § 1983
action); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970) (collat-
eral estoppel not applied because issue of perjury not actually litigated in conviction pro-
ceeding).
153. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (Younger doctrine applied to suit
seeking to enjoin, on due process grounds, use of Illinois Attachment Act); Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327 (1977) (Younger doctrine requires district court to dismiss suit seeking to enjoin
application of civil contempt statute on due process grounds).
154. Similarly, the focus of academic attention has been on subsequent actions raising
constitutional claims. See generally Averitt, supra note 18; McCormack, supra note 18, at
250; Theis, supra note 18; Torke, supra note 11.
155. See cases cited notes 44-46 supra.
156. See cases cited note 13 supra.
157. See cases cited note 154 supra.
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do so would render the civil rights acts a "dead letter." 158 The courts
that have not applied res judicata have generally been those faced with
cases where the federal claimant was an unwilling state court defend-
ant159 or where there were procedural due process flaws in the state
judicial process.' 60 Other courts have justified exceptions or expressed
a need for caution where there was a strong federal interest at stake.16
Moreover, the language in England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical
Examiners, 62 stressing the importance of federal factfinding on federal
issues, has been used as the basis for asserting a section 1983 exception
to res judicata.' 63
Commentators also have argued strongly for a section 1983 excep-
tion to res judicata. Although none have maintained that section 1983
claims always should be an exception, various standards have been
suggested for determining wherein res judicata should not be applica-
ble. One commentator has argued that res judicata should not bar the
subsequent section 1983 action when the state court litigation involved
an individual and a state as adverse parties to the controversy, where
the state had an institutional interest in the litigation, and where there
was a procedural defect such as inadequate factfinding. 164 Another po-
sition, 65 later adopted by the Second Circuit, 66 asserted that res judi-
cata should apply only when the federal claimant's constitutional
claims were freely presented in state court for conclusive resolution.
Other tests have focused on the predicament of unwilling state court
defendants forced to litigate their claims in a forum not of their choos-
ing. One proposed exception permits actions in which state remedies
were exhausted and the federal claimant was an unwilling defendant in
158. Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971).
159. See cases cited note 96 supra.
160. See Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
976 (1975) (res judicata not applicable to cases raising procedural due process claims);
Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978) (same); Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977) (same).
161. See Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1977).
162. 375 U.S. 411, 416-17 (1976): "Limiting the litigant to review here [following judg-
ment by a state court] would deny him the benefit of a federal trial court's role in construct-
ing a record and making fact findings. . . . The possibility of appellate review by this Court
of a state court determination may not be substituted, against a party's wishes, for his right
to litigate his federal claims fully in the federal courts."
163. Id.
164. McCormack, supra note 18, at 276-77.
165. Theis, supra note 20, at 882.
166. Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327 (2d Cir. 1977) (issues not raised are not barred by
res judicata); Newman v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004
(1975) (same).
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the state proceedings.1 67
All of these proposals are founded on the assumption that the state
courts will not always be fair forums for the resolution of federal con-
stitutional claims. The various tests focus on procedural defects in the
state court processes and the lack of interest or skill on the part of state
courts in enforcing rights guaranteed by the federal constitution.
Nonetheless, the litigant who chooses a state forum first invites no sym-
pathy. The courts and the commentators have sought only to protect
unwilling state defendants who must raise their constitutional claims
before an unfriendly state court or run the risk of claim preclusion.
For example, in Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 168 the defend-
ant was arrested under a constitutionally suspect park ordinance for
distributing political leaflets without a permit. He was convicted and
fined by a state criminal court. In such a situation, federal courts and
commentators have argued the state court almost automatically will de-
cide against the defendant on his or her constitutional claims. More-
over, because the defendant was brought unwillingly into state court
and forced to litigate there, it is urged such a judgment should not be
given collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. Advocates of this posi-
tion emphasize that constitutional claims are easily overlooked in such
situations because of the trial court's focus on the guilt or innocence of
the defendant. Furthermore, it is argued, to hold constitutional issues
that were raised but not addressed in a criminal proceeding as having
been implicitly decided, and thus forever barred, is to ignore the reali-
ties of state criminal prosecutions.169
Allegations of procedural due process violations are not limited to
criminal proceedings. In Robinson v. Artroshi170 and Sotomura v.
County of Hawaii,171 the losing state court litigants convinced the fed-
167. See note 96 supra. Another proposed exception is addressed only to collateral es-
toppel and provides that collateral estoppel should not apply to involuntary defendants in
state proceedings who were forced to exhaust their state judicial remedies. Developments,
supra note 18, at 1338-43.
168. 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974).
169. A distinction must be made between constitutional issues implicitly decided by the
conviction as part of the same cause of action and issues which constitute a different cause of
action. Judge Oakes, in his dissent, argued that the constitutionality of the prospective ap-
plication of the statute in Thislethwaite was a different cause of action from the question of
the statute's facial constitutionality. He therefore urged that the defendants' suit was not
precluded by collateral estoppel or res judicata. 497 F.2d at 343-44 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
See also cases cited note 152 supra.
170. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977). For a further discussion of the jurisprudential
issues raised in Robinson, see Chang, Unraveling Robinson v. Arioyosh" Can Courts Take
Profpery?, 2 U. HAW. L. REv. 57 (1979).
171. 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978).
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eral district court that denial of a rehearing on constitutional issues
raised by the state supreme court's decision was itself a violation of
their constitutional rights.' 72 Even state administrative proceedings,
despite subsequent state judicial review affirming the result, are subject
to procedural due process attack. The Fifth Circuit in Mack v. Florida
State Board of Dentistry173 found the administrative proceeding revok-
ing plaintiff's license to practice dentistry so procedurally unfair that it
refused to give res judicata effect to a state court judgment affirming-the
agency's decision.
In addition to suspicions that state court processes may be consti-
tutionally inadequate, some courts and commentators assert state
courts are not competent to consider federal constitutional claims. 7 4
State court judges, it is argued, lacking permanent tenure and closely
tied to state government, will not give the proper weight to constitu-
tional claims raised by litigants in proceedings against the state govern-
ments.' 75 Other commentators assert that state court judges are more
distant from the Supreme Court than federal judges and therefore are
less likely to be aware of recent constitutional developments. 76 Signifi-
cantly, these arguments have not been made in regard to state appellate
courts, which admittedly have a record equal to that of the federal
courts in protecting constitutional rights. 177 Despite the criticisms of
state trial court judges and the noted preference of litigants for federal
court, state courts nevertheless have jurisdictional power equivalent to
that of federal courts to decide federal constitutional claims.' 78
172. In Robinson the parties, on rehearing in the state supreme court, were allowed to
address the validity of the decision as it rested on the application of a Hawaii statute. They
were not heard on the constitutionality of the decision itself. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robin-
son, 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), ajf'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26
(1973). That issue was implicitly decided by the court's decision, because courts presump-
tively issue only decisions which they believe are constitutional.
173. 430 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
174. For a scathing attack on a state supreme court for ignoring procedural due process,
see Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977). See also Chevigny, Section
1983 Jurisdiction. A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352 (1970).
175. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 427 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
176. Cf Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1124-25 (1977)
("[f]ederal judges appear to recognize an affirmative obligation to carry out and even antici-
pate the direction of the Supreme Court. Many state judges, on the other hand, appear to
acknowledge only an obligation not to disobey clearly established law").
177. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 489 (1977). See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights In The Day Of The
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976).
178. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975): "[A]ppellee is in truth urg-
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Mitchum v. Foster
The first defense against the application of Rooker or res judicata
to subsequent section 1983 claims typically is reference to the Supreme
Court's decision in Mitchum . Foster.179 In Mitchum, the Court held
that section 1983 was an express exception to the Anti-Injunction
Act.180 The very purpose of section 1983, the Court stated, is to "inter-
pose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians
of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitu-
tional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive,
legislative or judicial.' "181
The narrow meaning of Mitchum, however, is that section 1983 is
an "expressly authorized exception" to section 2283, not to section
1738.182 Moreover, while a strained application of Mitchum might read
section 1983 as carving out an implied exception to section 1738, to
avoid the Rooker doctrine section 1983 would have to read as an im-
plicit modification of more basic statutory provisions: sections 1331,
1343 and 1257 of Title 28.
Furthermore, section 1983 creates a cause of action and not juris-
diction, particularly appellate jurisdiction, in the federal courts.183
There is no legislative history suggesting Congress intended section
1983 to be a vehicle for transferring state appellate jurisdiction to the
federal district courts. 84 The short life of the statute seeking to accom-
plish such a result through removal 85 only indicates that Congress
ing us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their constitu-
tional responsibilities. This we refuse to do."
179. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). See Averitt, supra note 18, at 210 (arguing that Michum im-
plies an exception to res judicata for § 1983); Currie, supra note 12, at 329 (noting and
disposing of Mitchum argument); Torke, supra note 11, at 558 (Mitchum supports an excep-
tion).
180. 407 U.S. 225.
181. Id. at 242 (citing Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
182. See Currie, supra note 12, at 329-30. Furthermore, in Mitchum the Supreme Court
applied Younger as a grounds for dismissal. 407 U.S. at 243.
183. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 535 (1974) ("§ 1983 merely creates a cause of ac-
tion and "does not by itself confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts to adjudicate these
claims"). See also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950) (Declara-
tory Judgment Act creates remedy but does not extend federal jurisdiction).
184. Indeed, it would seem such a major modification of § 1257 would have drawn
much more comment.
185. See Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need
for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 943 (1976). "In 1863 Congress pro-
vided for removal in certain cases to a circuit court before or after judgment in a state court
with explicit provision for retrial of the facts and law in circuit court." Id. at 947 n.22. The
statute was held unconstitutional.
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would have been explicit had section 1983 been intended to effect any
such dramatic change. In any event, because the question of federal
review of state court action in any forum was so controversial,186 an
attempt by the Supreme Court to enlarge the powers of review granted
to the lower courts surely would have received closer scrutiny in Con-
gress. Hence, Mitchum undoubtedly fails to state a civil rights excep-
tion to Rooker.
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners
Along with Mitchum, the Supreme Court's decision in England v.
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners 87 often is cited as the ba-
sis for a section 1983 exception to res judicata' 88 and is thus another
potential argument for the inapplicability of Rooker to section 1983
cases. In England the Supreme Court held that a federal court which
properly has jurisdiction may abstain and send the litigants to state
court to resolve issues of state law. If the litigants properly reserve their
federal issues, they may return to federal court without risking the
jeopardy of claim preclusion under res judicata. 89 In reaching this re-
sult, the Court emphasized the importance of federal factfinding on
federal questions.' 90 England has since been cited in the section 1983
res judicata cases 191 as somehow supporting the principle that if federal
claimants begin in state court (as either plaintiffs or defendants), they
may by so doing reserve their federal claims for subsequent resolution
in federal court. Res judicata would not apply in such case to state
determinations of federal issues.
Clearly, this analysis misconstrues England.92 England applies
only when litigants properly invoke federal jurisdiction first and are
sent to state court by a federal court retaining jurisdiction. In that situ-
ation, the litigants may return to federal court and the state court judg-
ment will not be barred by res judicata. Moreover, the England
186. See note 54 supra.
187. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
188. See Currie, supra note 12, at 331-32 (England argument disposed of); c. Averitt,
supra note 20, at 212 (citing England as support for guaranteeing access to a federal forum).
189. See 375 U.S. at 417.
190. Id. at 416.
191. See cases cited note 13 supra.
192. See Wilke & Holzheizer, Inc. v. Reimel, 266 F. Supp. 168 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (three
judge court rejecting plaintiffs argument that even though the litigants started out in state
court, federal claims could be reserved for resolution in federal court). But see McCormack,
supra note 18, at 331 ("tlhe plaintiff in Wilke had done everything required by England
aside from actually making an appearance in federal court to reserve his federal claims").
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doctrine itself is confusing, 93 encourages delays, 194 and is inconsistent
with federal jurisdiction and section 1738.195 Nowhere has this confu-
sion been more evident than in the cases involving both res judicata
and section 1983, where litigants initially in federal court have been
sent to state court under abstention doctrines, 9 6 yet have been barred
by res judicata on their return to federal court. 197
As Professor Currie observes, England violates the principle that a
federal court should go on to decide the case when federal jurisdiction
is properly invoked.'9 8 Further, England completely contradicts the
Rooker mandate that final state court judgments, notwithstanding fed-
eral abstention, bar subsequent federal review.199 Indeed, England
alienates federal-state relations by depriving state courts of their power
to decide constitutional questions and by compelling them, in many
cases, to issue what are essentially advisory opinions. 200
England's disregard of the statutory command of section 1738 is
problematic itself but, in light of Rooker, serious questions remain over
the jurisdictional power of a federal court to take a case back from state
court and refuse to give effect to the state court judgment. If the state
court had jurisdiction after abstention, the federal court is clearly act-
ing as an appellate court of the state. The Supreme Court in England,
thus appears to have divested itself of its statutorily conferred exclusive
jurisdiction to review state court judgments without a valid basis for
that action.
Another interpretation of England is that state court jurisdiction
193. McCormack, supra note 18, at 270.
194. Abstention, in general, entails delays of several years. See, e.g., England .v. Louisi-
ana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (six years); United States v. Leiter
Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965) (mooted out eight years after abstention ordered);
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (seven years).
195. Currie, supra note 12, at 331 ("[t]o reduce the violence abstention does to section
1331, England ignores 1738").
196. See note 202 infra.
197. Cornwel v. Ferguson, 545 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1977); Kay v. Florida Bar, 323 F.
Supp. 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (incorrectly applying England).
198. Currie, supra note 12, at 331.
199. If the state court properly has jurisdiction after abstention, then its decision must be
conclusive as to all issues even though not raised-including the reserved federal issues.
Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S.
351, 353 (1876). Thus, under Rooker, the state judgment deprives the federal court of juris-
diction to determine the reserved federal issues.
200. In United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964), the Fifth
Circuit abstained so that the state court could clarify a question of state law. The Texas
Supreme Court refused to do so because the decision would be only an "advisory opinion."
396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
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over the entire controversy is simply an illusion, that the state court has
the power to decide the case as to state issues but may only "comment"
on federal questions. Because the federal court in England was obli-
gated in any event to apply state law, it may be concluded that the
federal court has granted nothing substantive to the state court. One
might say that the state court acts as a "special master" as to state law
questions.20' If so, England allows federal courts to impose a role upon
state courts that is constitutionally suspect and not intended by Con-
gress. 20 2 If the principles of Rooker are correct, then England is wrong,
for it represents an attempt by the Supreme Court to divest itself of its
exclusive jurisdiction over state court judgments. Only Congress has
the authority to make such a decision.
Unwilling State Defendants
The argument for a guaranteed right to "one federal forum" 20 3 in
section 1983 cases is based on a perception that state courts are less
capable than federal courts of resolving federal claims. Professor Cur-
rie counters this argument by noting that Congress could have pro-
vided for removal to federal courts where the answer alleges a defense
involving a federal question.20 4 Further, the Supreme Court recently
has emphasized that the federal courts are not to doubt the ability of
state tribunals to resolve federal claims.205 The concurrent jurisdiction
of state and federal courts over constitutional claims and the policies
embodied in Rooker and section 1738 create little doubt that Congress
did not intend to provide a rule guaranteeing access to a federal district
court. Both Rooker and section 1738 command federal courts to apply
claim or issue preclusion regardless of whether the party was a state
court plaintiff or defendant.
201. In essence, state supreme courts would be performing a non-binding certification
service. See Developments, supra note 18, at 1253 n.21 (authorities on state law certification).
202. Id. Congress has not passed a compulsory certification statute. The problems aris-
ing from the England decision actually are the result of the Court's attempt to ameliorate the
harshness of the abstention doctrine announced in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman announced the doctrine that federal courts should decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction in favor of a state court determination in cases involving unsettled issues of
state law which could moot or alter the federal constitutional claims. See generally Develop-
ments, 1250-51, 1253 n.20.
203. See Comment, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of State Criminal Convictions in Sec-
tion 1983.Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 95, 101-06 (1975) ("alternate federal forum" proposal).
204. Currie, supra note 12, at 333: "The normal means of effectuating a congressional
judgment that state courts afford inadequate protection of federal defenses would have been
to authorize removal by state court defendants raising those defenses."
205. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
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Given that state courts have equal power to decide questions of
constitutional law, final state court judgments on section 1983 claims
must be treated with the same force and effect as state court judgments
on state law. Federal courts have no power to review such judgments,
for if they did, they would be acting impermissibly as state appellate
courts. The proper application of Rooker has not been lost only on the
lower federal courts. The Supreme Court also has failed to apply it in
the Younger line of cases where it was clearly appropriate.
The Younger Doctrine
In Younger v. Harris,20 6 the Court held that for reasons of equity,
comity and federalism, federal courts may not interfere in pending
state criminal proceedings except under narrowly defined circum-
stances.207 In succeeding cases, Younger was extended to include civil
as well as criminal proceedings, 208and completed, 20 9 as opposed to
merely pending, state proceedings. 210 Professor Currie observes that,
as to completed state proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata is a more
legitimate ground of decision than Younger.21' The import of that
analysis also applied to Rooker. Where res judicata would bar the
claim, Rooker also would deprive the federal court of jurisdiction.21 2
Thus, Rooker, and not res judicata or Younger, is the obligatory
grounds for the dismissal in these cases. 213 The federal courts should
not reach the resjudicata or Younger issues. Huffman . Pursue, Ltd.214
illustrates this point well. Civil nuisance proceedings instituted pursu-
ant to an Ohio statute were brought against Pursue's predecessor in
interest for operating a pornographic movie theater. The state court
declared the movies obscene and ordered the theater closed for one
year. The judgment also provided for seizure and sale of all personal
206. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
207. Id. at 44-45.
208. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
209. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
210. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
211. Currie, supra note 12, at 319-21.
212. See text accompanying notes 106-225 supra.
213. Professor Currie notes the applicability of Rooker, but does not concede that its
scope is coextensive with resjudicata. Particularly, he asserts that the Rooker doctrine is not
broad enough to cover such cases as Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), where the
federal plaintiff seeks to relitigate issues that should have been raised in the state court pro-
ceeding. He argues that only res judicata can "fill the gap." See Currie, supra note 12, at
324-25.
214. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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property used in conducting the nuisance. 215 Instead of appealing the
judgment within the state system, Pursue filed a section 1983 action in
federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. A three judge
court21 6 was convened to review the constitutionality of the statute.
The court found the statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad and en-
joined the enforcement of the state court judgment as to movies not
declared obscene. The three judge court did not discuss the applicabil-
ity of Younger.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, reversed,
citing the applicability of the federalism principles expressed in
Younger. The Court found it was unimportant that the action was la-
beled a civil proceeding, noting that it actually was quasi-criminal in
nature and that the state was seeking to vindicate an important state
interest.217 Nor was it critical to the Court that the state proceedings
were completed rather than pending. The principles of Younger still
applied because federal jurisdiction after a final state court judgment
would be even more duplicative than intervention in pending proceed-
ings.2 t 8 Moreover, Justice Rehnquist stated that Younger required ex-
haustion of state court appellate remedies before attempting to invoke
federal district court jurisdiction: "For regardless of when the Court of
Common Pleas' judgment became final, we believe that a necessary
concomitant of Younger is that a party in appellee's posture must ex-
haust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District
Court .... ,,219
This requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies pro-
voked a spirited retort from the three dissenting Justices in Huff man.220
They viewed it as the first step toward reversing the settled doctrine
that section 1983 actions may be maintained without exhaustion of
state judicial remedies.2 2 ' The dissent reminded the majority that, un-
der Monroe v. Pape,22 in section 1983 cases the federal remedy is sup-
plementary to the state remedy223 and that state remedies need not be
exhausted before a federal claim is invoked. Moreover, they argued,
215. Id. at 595-99.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1976) authorizes a three judge district court in certain cases.
217. 420 U.S. at 604.
218. Id. at 608.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 617 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. See Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
222. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
223. 420 U.S. at 617 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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under the ruling in Huffman, "the mere filing of a complaint against a
potential section 1983 litigant forces him to exhaust state remedies." 224
However contradictory it may seem, there is merit in both the dis-
sent's arguments and the result in Huffman. The dissent is correct in
observing that there is no requirement of exhaustion of state judicial
remedies prior to filing a section 1983 action in the federal courts.
225
Nevertheless, Huffman reached the correct result, but Rooker, not
Younger, should have been its rationale. Res judicata would have pro-
duced the same result, but the defendants apparently failed to raise it,
and it was deemed waived.226 Younger is a contorted means of reach-
ing the proper result in Huffman. To use the Younger doctrine in
Huffman, the Court had to apply the doctrine to completed, as opposed
to pending, and civil, as opposed to criminal, proceedings. Moreover,
because appeals were not taken in state courts in Huffman, Justice
Rehnquist's reasoning required the creation of a judicial exhaustion re-
quirement in section 1983 actions.
There is no need to use the Younger doctrine to bar federal actions
subsequent to completed state proceedings, civil or criminal. When
Younger is stretched to cover the Huffman situation, an exhaustion of
remedies requirement must be created. But when properly analyzed
under Rooker, there is no question of exhausting state judicial remedies
prior to relitigating in federal court because there is simply no allow-
ance for relitigation of the same cause of action in federal court. The
failure to appeal within the state court system is not a waiver of access
to a federal forum, as any "exhaustion" discussion implies, but rather is
simply the decision to live with a lower court judgment. As such, a
final state court judgment will create a claim preclusion effect as to any
later action. Thus, "[flederal posttrial interventions, in a fashion
designed to annul the results of a state trial,"227 should not be solved
under Younger but under Rooker. Where the federal action is to annul
the state court judgment, it is necessarily precluded because it is an
appeal of a state court judgment. In essence, Rooker expresses the
same federalism principles that Justice Rehnquist enunciated in
Huffman: that intervention after trial is duplicative of the trial that has
already taken place, implying a direct aspersion on the capabilities and
good faith of state courts in resolving constitutional issues, and that
posttrial federal nullification is offensive to a state which has already
224. Id.
225. Developments, supra note 18, at 1264.
226. 420 U.S. at 607 n.19.
227. Id. at 609.
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won a determination that its policies have been violated. 228 These prin-
ciples already are expressed implicitly in the exclusivity principle of
section 1257 and the limitation of original jurisdiction in sections 1331
and 1343.
Although Younger and Rooker state similar principles, the appli-
cability of Rooker in Younger situations has not always been obvious.
Professor Currie argues that Rooker would not cover situations such as
in Sosna v. Iowa229 and Wooley v. Maynard,230 where "the federal
plaintiff seeks not to avoid the direct consequences of a state judgment
but to relitigate issues that were or should have been raised in the state
proceedings."'23' As the scope of res judicata and Rooker are identical,
however, Sosna and Wooley must be decided on Rooker grounds.
Sosna v. Iowa232 upheld an Iowa statute that imposed a one year
residency requirement on divorce plaintiffs. Ms. Sosna, who had re-
sided in Iowa for less than one year, filed for divorce. Her husband
made a special appearance to quash the petition and the Iowa court
dismissed. Instead of appealing through the Iowa state courts, Ms. Sos-
na filed an action in federal district court seeking declaratory and in-
junctive relief on the ground that the statute infringed upon her
fundamental right to travel. The United States Supreme Court urged
the parties to consider Younger.233 The parties did not do so and the
Court eventually decided the case on the merits of the constitutional
issue. Ms. Sosna undoubtedly could have raised her constitutional
claims in state trial and appellate courts. Thus, if Iowa law would not
have allowed her to split her constitutional argument into a separate
claim, Rooker would have barred the federal district court from taking
jurisdiction.
In Wooley v. Maynard,234 Maynard was convicted for covering the
state motto, "Live Free or Die," which appeared on his automobile
license plate. As interpreted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
this act was a misdemeanor under a state statute. Maynard did not ap-
peal his convictions, but instead brought a section 1983 action in fed-
eral court seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional
228. Id. at 608-09.
229. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
230. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
231. Currie, supra note 12, at 324-15.
232. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
233. Id. at 396 n.3.
234. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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and injunctive relief against any future arrests and prosecutions. A
three judge district court entered an order granting the injunctive relief.
The Supreme Court held Younger inapplicable.235 Moreover, the
Court distinguished Huffman, which was similar in that the federal
claimant had failed to exhaust state appellate remedies, on the ground
that the relief sought in Maynard was wholly prospective and was "in
no way 'designed to annul the results of a state trial.' "236 Was Rooker
applicable? The key question is whether a claim for prospective relief
would be considered the same claim as that upon which the misde-
meanor conviction was based. Rooker compels the federal court to
look to New Hampshire law, which suggests that the cause of action
would be different.237 While the result appears correct, the Court's fail-
ure to discuss state law which defines the scope of a claim under either
Rooker or section 1738 is troubling. The "prospective only" basis of
the decision must be viewed as a distinction applicable only to the
Younger doctrine. However, Rooker was the correct basis for the deci-
sion.
The lower federal courts have taken their cues from the Supreme
Court and applied Younger instead of Rooker. In one case,238 the Fifth
Circuit even implied that Younger and Rooker embody the same prin-
ciple.239 Both are federalism principles, but as to completed state pro-
ceedings, Rooker must be considered before resorting to Younger.
Conclusion
The importance of recognizing the application of Rooker cannot
be overemphasized. The effect of allowing the lower federal courts to
act as the appellate courts of the state not only contravenes the statu-
tory grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts but undermines state
judicial sovereignty. No longer are state court judgments final and
235. Id. at 711.
236. Id.
237. See Bottomley v. Parmenter, 85 N.H. 322, 326, 159 A. 302, 304 (1932) (implying
that the causes of action for quantum meruit and contract are different); Currie, supra note
12, at 350 n.216.
238. Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
239. 477 F.2d at 252-53 (Rooker is argued as supporting the decision under Younger).
See also New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 764 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894
(1978) (Younger held not applicable; Rooker should have been used to sustain lower court
dismissal); Piatt v. Louisville & Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 556 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1977)
(decided on Huffman grounds; Rooker a better basis for decision); Williams v. Washington,
554 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1977) (Rooker mentioned, but case improperly decided on Younger
grounds).
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state courts the final arbiters of state law.2 40 The prospect that state
court judgments may be attacked under section 1983 substantially im-
pedes the ability of state court litigants to achieve one major goal of
litigation: final resolution of a dispute. For winners and losers alike,
the most important aspect of the system is missing. The Utah Supreme
Court's statement in Pope v. Turner24' is illustrative: "In other words,
we are given the satisfaction of knowing that that which we do in this
matter is of no consequence whatsoever and that the ruling of the
Supreme Court of a sovereign state of the Union is subject to the whim
of the inferior courts in the Federal system." Responsibility falls on the
Supreme Court to safeguard state jurisdictional sovereignty against im-
permissible encroachments by the lower federal courts. The Court not
only is "supreme" over all other courts but, more importantly, it alone
has been granted exclusive jurisdiction to review state judgments. By
failing to reverse lower courts on the basis of the Rooker doctrine, the
Supreme Court is implicitly divesting itself of its jurisdiction. Just as
the lower federal courts may not on their own enlarge their jurisdic-
tion,242 the Supreme Court may not, without congressional permission,
share its exclusive jurisdiction with the lower courts. Such a delicate
issue of fundamental federal-state relations must be left to a representa-
tive forum, such as Congress, where the justifications for state judicial
sovereignty can be fully represented.2 43
Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Konigsberg v. State Bar,244 wherein
he reminded the Court of the historical background of its own j urisdic-
tion, is here appropriate. He cited Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, who
240. For dramatic instances of where federal district courts have usurped the ability of
state supreme courts to decide questions of state law with finality, see Sotomura v. County of
Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473 (D. Hawaii 1978) (federal district court voiding state supreme
court decision on question of ownership of beaches); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559
(D. Hawaii 1977) (voiding state supreme court decision on question of water rights). But see
Smiley v. South Dakota, 551 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1977) (federal courts have no jurisdiction to
review state supreme court decisions in appellate capacity; Rooker applied); Zimring v. Ha-
waii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979) (same).
241. 30 Utah 2d 286, 289, 517 P.2d 536, 537 (1973). Although Pope is a habeas corpus
case, the court's sentiments may be shared by state supreme courts whose judgments have
been nullified in the civil area.
242. See note 82 & accompanying text supra.
243. See generally National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 876-78 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Jilt is unacceptable that the judicial process should be thought
superior to the political process in this area"); Choper, The Scope of National Power VLis-a-
Vis the States." The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977) (Congress, as
a respresentative body, is better adapted to decide constitutional questions regarding the
power of the national government vis-A-vis the states).
244. 353 U.S. 252, 274 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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stated more than a hundred years earlier: "Let it be remembered,
also,-for just now we may be in some danger of forgetting it,-that
questions of jurisdiction were questions of power as between the
United States and the several states." 245 Frankfurter went on to cite
Justice Stone's opinion for a unanimous court in Healy v. Ratta:
246
"Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which
should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine
their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute [imple-
menting the judiciary sections of the Constitution] has defined." 247
Now, more than ever, the Court is acutely aware of the need to
balance state and federal judicial interests. For that reason, the implicit
jurisdictional principle of federalism expressed in Rooker and long
overlooked must be rediscovered.
245. Id. (quoting B. CURTIS, A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS 340-41 (1879)).
246. 292 U.S. 263 (1934).
247. 353 U.S. at 274 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263,
270 (1934)).
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